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Aviation safety organizations have recommended that airline pilots are trained for 
startle and surprise. However, little information is available on useful training 
interventions. Therefore, a training intervention trial was executed during airline 
recurrent simulator training. The method consisted of a slow visual scan from the 
side-window, over the instruments, ending with facing the other pilot. Following a 
recorded video instruction, 38 airline pilots in two-pilot crews performed a 
training scenario in which they could apply the method. Data on application and 
evaluation of the method were obtained from each pilot. Few pilots actually 
applied the method (18.4%), and many gave low ratings to applicability of the 
method in the scenario, as well as in operational practice. Results show that a 
startle management method, as well as manner in which it is trained, should be 
carefully evaluated before being implemented in training practice.
Aviation safety organizations have recently recommended that pilot training should include 
specific means to deal with startle and surprise. Although startle is commonly used to designate 
both startle and surprise, strictly seen, startle refers to a reflexive stress response, whereas a 
surprise occurs when information is encountered that does not fit within one’s mental model of 
the situation (Rivera et al., 2014). If both are experienced simultaneously, there needs to be an 
adjustment of the mental model under high stress, which can be very difficult (Landman et al., 
2017). This may result in panic, cognitive lockup and total confusion. Training interventions that 
have been proposed include teaching pilots certain actions to “break out” of this state. An 
example of this would be a checklist specifically focused on relaxation, problem analysis and 
decision-making. The application rate of such a method was high in an experimental setting and 
pilots generally appreciated it, however, some also indicated that it was too distracting or 
complex (Landman et al., 2019). 
The current study tested a simpler startle management method, consisting of a slow 
scanning motion of the head from the side window, over the instrument panel, ending with 
facing one the other pilot. The reasoning behind this method were as follows. First, it may help 
one consider the overall situation, including the other pilot’s state, instead of immediately 
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zooming in on the problem. Looking out the side window, which is also used in initial training 
and aerobatics, can be used to obtain natural sense of the aircraft’s attitude. Second, the method 
buys time and prevents intuitive reactions to a problem that is not fully understood yet. In a 
similar manner, standard procedures to recover from spatial disorientation include a first step of 
recognizing and confirming the spatial disorientation, before attempting to recover (e.g., Previc 
& Ercoline, 1999). Third, performing a slow, conscious motion may instill a sense of control and 
stimulate goal-directed processing, as high stress is known to shift attentional control towards 
being more stimulus-driven (Eysenck, Derakhshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007). Potential advantages 
that this method may have compared to a checklist, are that it is faster, simpler, more active and 
more specific (compared to e.g. the command to “Observe”). The current paper describes an 
early-stage trial of this method, to obtain data on its application and perceived usefulness in a 
representative sample of airline pilots in a standard training setting. 
Method 
Participants 
Data were collected of 38 B737 pilots (18 captains and 18 first officers) and 18 Bombardier 
Q400 pilots (9 captains and 9 first officers). One dataset of a captain was excluded as this person 
was involved in the intervention method design. For privacy reasons, no other personal data was 
collected. The experience level of the B737 pilots was generally higher than that of the Q400 
pilots, with circa 2,500-25,000 hours compared to 600-12,000 hours. Pilots were informed that 
their data would be processed anonymously. They were also free to refrain from filling in the 
questionnaire, but there were no refusals. 
Training intervention 
The experiment took place during a recurrent simulator training session at Luxair, Luxembourg 
Airlines. The training intervention consisted of an 8-minute instructional video, in which a type 
rating instructor gave information about startle and surprise, and outlined the intervention 
method: 1) Turn your head to the outside shoulder, look out of the side window. 2) Turn your 
head back in a continuous movement, check your flight instruments. 3) Continue turning and see 
your colleague’s flight instruments. 4) Continue turning and have a look at your colleague. 5) 
Now turn back and evaluate the situation. The total duration of the method can be under 10 
seconds. The video demonstrated execution of the method from a first-person view in the 
cockpit. 
Scenarios 
The B737 training session was a Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), which consisted of a 
complete flight from Tenerife (TFS) to Luxembourg (LUX). In cruise, the crew received 
warnings from ATC about an explosive device being on board. Sharing workload with the first 
officer, the commander would need to order a search and prepare the cabin for descent. During 
descend, the device would trigger, causing an elevator runaway. Since the explosion in the B737 





    
    
    
      
      
      
      
The Q400 training session consisted of practicing several flight situations. The scenario 
that was used for the experiment involved a double engine malfunction, one after the other. The 
standard procedure in this case would not be adequate, as it would cause both engines to be shut 
down simultaneously. The inadequacy of standard procedures was expected to be surprising and 
stressful. 
Dependent measures 
During the debriefing of the training session, the pilots filled in questionnaires, which were 
collected in sealed envelopes. As a manipulation check of the scenarios, the following variables 
were rated on a 1-5 scale, ranging from very little (1) to very much (5): Surprise by the ATC 
warning (B737) or engine malfunctions (Q400) and Startle by the device explosion (B737) or 
engine malfunctions (Q400). Anxiety following the events was rated on a 10 cm horizontal 
visual-analogue scale ranging from none at all to maximum (Houtman & Bakker, 1983). Mental 
demand and perceived time pressure following the ATC message (B737) or engine malfunction 
(Q400) were rated on the NASA-TLX mental demand and temporal demand subscales (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988). Finally, pilots also indicated whether they were informed by colleagues about 
the events in the scenario. 
Next, pilots were asked if they applied the training intervention during the scenario. If 
confirmed, they were asked at which moments they applied it, and to what extent they felt that it 
helped them, as rated from very little (1) to very much (5). On a similar scale, all pilots rated how 
useful the method would be in operational practice. If pilots did not apply it, they indicated if this 
was mainly because they forgot, because they didn’t find it applicable to the situation, or because 
they used a different method to manage their startle. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
The manipulation check shows that pilots found the scenarios moderately surprising and 
stressful, scoring on average around the midpoint on the scales (Table 1 and 2). It is interesting 
that startle and surprise scores spread from the lowest to the highest endpoints, indicating that 
pilots may experience the same scenario very differently. Anxiety levels are similar between the 
groups, while the Q400 group reported somewhat higher surprise and the B737 group more 
startle. In the B737 group, 45 % (17) of the pilots were informed about the scenario, whereas 54
% (20) were not, and one skipped the question. The Q400 pilots all reported not being informed. 
Table 1. 
Pilots’ subjective experience of the B737 bomb threat scenario.
Mean (SD) Minimum Maximum
Startle (explosion) (1-5) 3.05 (1.21) 1 5
Surprise (message) (1-5) 3.11 (1.13) 1 5
Mental demand (message) (5-100) 51.7 (16.1) 15 75
Time pressure (message) (5-100) 57.2 (20.0) 20 95
Anxiety (message) (0-10) 4.5 (2.3) 0.0 7.5
Anxiety (explosion) (0-10) 5.1 (2.3) 0.0 10.0
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Table 2. 
Pilots’ subjective experience of the Q400 double engine malfunction scenario.
Mean (SD) Minimum Maximum
Startle (1-5) 2.61 (.92) 1 4
Surprise (1-5) 3.33 (.91) 1 5
Mental demand (5-100) 58.6 (17.2) 35 100
Time pressure (5-100) 54.4 (17.2) 25 90
Anxiety (0-10) 5.1 (1.9) 1.7 8.0
Application of the startle management method 
In the B737 group, 9 out of 38 pilots (24 %) applied the method in the scenario. Eight when the 
explosion occurred, and one as an extra scan to check for issues. Of those not applying the 
method, most indicated that they forgot (37 %), or found it not applicable (37 %). Others 
reported they used a different method to manage startle (26 %).  
In the Q400 group, 4 out of 18 pilots (22 %) applied the method in the scenario. Most 
pilots did not find in applicable in the scenario (56 %), some forgot (16.7 %) and one used a 
different method (5.6 %). All in all, the application rate of the method was low and it was similar 
in the different scenarios. 
Perceived usefulness of the startle management method 
The perceived usefulness of the method in the scenarios is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen in 
the figure, there were many in the B737 group who rated the method of very little use, whereas 
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Figure 1. 
Pilots’ perceived usefulness of the startle management method in the scenario. Only those who 

















The perceived usefulness of the method in operational practice is shown in Figure 2. It was 
similar to the ratings of usefulness in the scenario. Although the Q400 group seemed a little more 
positive towards the method, both groups included a relatively large proportion of pilots who 
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Figure 2. 
Pilots’ perceived usefulness of the startle management method in operational practice.  
Discussion 
This experiment shows that pilots found the tested startle management method generally of little 
to moderate use in the scenarios and in operational practice. It is most notable that the 
intervention had a very low application rate (22-24 %), and a relatively large proportion of pilots 
(22-24 %) rated the method to be of very little use in practice. This is in contrast to a checklist-
based startle management method, which was applied by all, and rated, on average, to be of very 
little use by 8 % of the participating pilots (Landman et al., 2019). There are some 
methodological aspects of the current study that may have caused lower ratings and application 
compared to the other study. First, there was very little time available in the experimental 
training session to explain the reasoning behind the method. With more time, the reasoning 
behind the method can be explained and there would be more room for discussing the method 
beforehand, which may improve the pilots’ openness towards it. Second, the tested startle 
management method was introduced during a mandatory training session. On the one hand, this
mandatory setting could make the pilots more resistant to accepting the method. On the other 
hand, the current sample group is more representative of the general pilot population, compared 
to a group who participated in an experimental study based on invitation (Landman et al., 2019). 
Third, many pilots, especially those in the Q400 engine malfunction group indicated that the 
scenario was not startling enough for the method to be applicable. One remarked that it might be
more useful “in cruise, when not mentally prepared for a malfunction, as we are in the 
simulator.” 
Besides the manner in which the instructions of the method were given, there are some 
aspects of the method itself that can be adapted to improve it. First, most pilots who applied the 
method in the experiment, applied it together with their fellow pilot, indicating that if one pilot 














might thus be improved by adding a callout at the start (e.g., “Let’s do a scan”). Second, pilots 
indicated that they particularly experienced looking out of the side window as unhelpful. Some 
remarked that they thought it would be disorienting in-flight; that it seemed senseless; and that it 
caused them to lose time. Some of these objections can potentially be tacked with an explanation 
of the purpose behind the “senseless” and counter-intuitive actions. However, these objections 
may also indicate that the tested method may benefit from including actions that are more task-
focused. Task-focus is known as an effective coping mechanism against performance stress (see 
e.g., Baumeister 1984, Matthews, Hillyard, & Campbell, 1999). Consciously working on (part 
of) a solution to the stressful problem, even if that means systematically gathering information or 
simplifying the situation, may give a sense of control and instill confidence. Perhaps placing 
more emphasis on a structured scan of the instruments and checking verbally with one’s fellow 
pilot would improve the acceptance and effectiveness of the method. 
In conclusion, whereas the current experiment had a strong practical approach, this made 
it difficult to accurately measure pilots’ evaluations of the method. In order to obtain a more 
accurate picture, pilots could be tasked with executing and evaluating a method in a more 
experimental setting. Also, the experiment shows the importance to reserve time and resources 
for the development, training and testing of a startle management method, so that the end product 
is an effective method that pilots will apply in practice. 
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